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The trajectories of internationalisation followed by family firms can be 
viewed from several theoretical approaches: phases and models of the 
internationalisation process; international entrepreneurship, the sociological 
perspective and family business theory. A historical perspective of 
internationalised family firms, allowing for the integration of the 
abovementioned approaches, is useful to obtain a deep understanding of the 
internationalisation process of different sectors and of different countries. The 
main purpose of this paper is to identify the facilitating and restricting factors 
during the internationalisation path of family firms, whilst considering the 
influence in their competitive advantages, of ownership structure, management 
attitudes and other intangible assets, as well as external factors to the firms, 
like location. The research involved a long run analysis (of more than one 
century) of two firms which operate in the cork business in Spain and Portugal: 
Mundet & C.ª, Lda and Corticeira Amorim. One of these companies - Mundet - 
was closed down in the 1980s and the other – Corticeira Amorim – became, 
and still is, the leading firm worldwide in the cork industry. A detailed 
comparison of these two histories - one of failure, and the other of success - 
permits an accurate identification of the determinants of successful 
internationalisation. In fact, this comparison is useful for understanding several 
characteristics of both firms, some of which are similar and others which are 
different, allowing to test several hypotheses within the context of the 
theoretical approach of the internationalisation of family firms. This 
methodological option can be justify by several aspects. 
Firstly, both are family firms operating in the same business and both were 
concentrated on the foreign market since their conception. Secondly, both their 
histories encompass most of the 20th Century and both faced similar national 
and international constraints, which were overcome, as they both ended up 
becoming the leading firms in the cork business, although at different periods 
of time. Thirdly, their choices of location were different and, although in both 
cases they benefitted from agglomeration forces during certain phases of the 
business, location was an important determinant of the opposing destinies of 
these two emblematic cork family firms from Iberia. 
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1. Introduction1 
                                                     
1 Previous versions and results included in this paper have been presented at APDR 2014 and ERSA 2014.   Corresponding 
author: ameliab@iseg.ulisboa.pt. 
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Family firms are crucial for economic growth and in the European context they represent over 
60% of the total number of European companies, and 40% - 50% of all jobs, numbering over 100 
million employees (European Commission, 2009). The Iberian Peninsula is no exception: family 
firms represented over 60% of GDP during the period of 1959 - 2000 (Colli and Rose 2008: 201).  
There is no single definition of “family firms”, as they present a variety of features in terms of 
size, ownership, financial framework, etc. According to Colli and Rose (2008: 194), a family firm “is 
one where a family owns enough of the equity to be able to exert control over strategy and is 
involved in top management positions”2 . By emphasising the proportion of family-owned shares 
and the corresponding voting rights and the aspects of management, the above definition also 
includes intergenerational succession, whereby the founder or a member of the family has to be the 
chief executive of the company.  
Whether they be small, medium or large in size, most of the family firms have exhibited a 
resilient pattern through all three industrial revolutions and have maintained long-established 
international businesses, without losing the family character, as the families managed to keep the 
control and leadership of the business.  
The evolution of the internationalisation of family firms through time can be viewed from several 
theoretical approaches. This paper follows a historical approach, which allows for the integration of 
several theoretical frameworks, particularly with regard to the internationalisation theory and the 
family business theory. Its main purpose is to identify the facilitating/restricting factors behind the 
success of two family firms, both of which have international business in the cork industry, by 
considering the creation/absence of competitive advantages in terms of ownership structure and 
management attitudes and intangible assets and other relevant factors, whether they be internal 
and/or external to the firm, like the location choice.  
This paper describes a long run evolution (over almost one century) of two firms operating in 
the cork business in the Iberian Peninsula: Mundet&Cª, Lda., and Corticeira Amorim. One of these 
firms - Mundet – was closed down in the 1980s, and the other – Corticeira Amorim – became the 
leading company worldwide in the cork business and still maintains this leadership. Although they 
both followed different models of internationalisation, Mundet resembled a “born again global firm”, 
whilst Amorim is a “traditional firm”. The careful comparison of their two histories, one being of 
failure and the other of success, enables an accurate identification of the determinants of successful 
internationalisation.  
                                                     
2 See also Colli, Canal-Garcia and Guillén (2013); Colli and Larsson (2014); European Commission (2009); Graves and 
Thomas (2008); Zahara (2003) and La Porta, López de Silanes and Shleifer (1999). 
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Furthermore, both firms had a similar business framework. Firstly, the Iberian Peninsula 
reunites the perfect natural conditions for growing the cork oak tree (Quercus Suber), and Spain 
and Portugal are the most important producers of cork in Iberia. Both firms explored this natural 
competitive advantage. Secondly, the international dimension of the cork business was always 
present in Spain and Portugal. The major buyers of cork products have been those developed 
countries that do not possess this raw material (or at least in abundance) although, up until the 
1950s, they concentrated most of the value added activities. Spain and Portugal, being 
economically less developed, did not possess enough capital to develop the processing industry 
(with the exception of Catalonia), and the only activities carried out were restricted to cork 
preparation and the export of cork planks for the production of cork finished products. Thirdly, up 
until the late 19th Century, this industry was essentially based on the manufacture of natural cork 
stoppers. However, at the end of the 19th Century, a radical innovation occurred - the agglomerated 
cork -, which changed the industrial landscape. The larger and more capital-intensive firms started 
to use the waste materials that originated from the natural cork industry. The location strategies of 
these firms reflected the role of more developed countries, whose foreign investments were 
concentrated in those countries which produced the raw material. Mundet was one of these cases. 
Initially it was owned by Spanish capital and exported agglomerated cork products. Conversely, 
Amorim exported natural cork stoppers up until the 1960s.  
 Considering past research about the context of the cork business and bearing in mind the 
theoretical approach, the research questions are:  
1) What were the main characteristics of the family business that boost the competitive 
advantages of Corticeira Amorim? 
2) Were these characteristics absent in Mundet’s case, causing the failure of the company? 
3) Regarding the success of Corticeira Amorim, were the family firm characteristics reinforced 
by other features, such as for instance, the location of the firm?  
In order to answer these three questions, we consider two hypotheses. Firstly, that the 
success/failure of a multinational family firm is related to those features of a family business that 
boost/constrain a competitive advantage in foreign markets. These features are related to 
ownership structure and to top management. Secondly, the regional roots of the firms reinforce the 
following features of a family business: trust, reputation, cohesion and altruistic behaviour, which 
means that the “family effect” can be reinforced by the “regional effect”. Following Puig and Pérez 
(2009: 467), the small size of firms can be compensated by collaboration with other family firms 
within the same industrial district, which suppresses limitations in terms of economies of scale and 
maintains much-needed flexibly in the context of growing uncertainty in international markets. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework, and has three 
sub-sections, namely: internationalisation models; determinants of success in a family business 
internationalisation process and the location of family firms in industrial districts or clusters. In 
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Section 3, a detailed empirical analysis is carried out of the determinants of success/failure of the 
two firms in a comparative perspective. Finally, in Section 4, the concluding remarks are made. We 
concluded that both family and district effects mutually reinforced each other in building success in 
the internationalisation process. On the one hand, slowness and the exercise of caution during the 
internationalisation process can be advantageous at an early stage. This slowness may be a result 
of not only risk aversion, which is typical of a family business, but also of the role of the firm within 
the industrial district. Secondly, district effects can also lead to greater success in 
internationalisation, in terms of the presence of relationships based on trust within the region and 
with its institutions.  
As a means of better supporting the comparative analysis of the evolution of the two firms 
studied in this paper, as well as their relative economic performance over the long run and their 
failures and successes, a useful and detailed chronology is provided (in an appendix at the end of 
the paper) which marks the main events and milestones of these emblematic Iberian cork industry 
firms, the first, and now extinct, leader, Mundet, and also Corticeira Amorim, the current undisputed 
world leader. 
 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1 Internationalisation Models 
 
The decision to internationalise a business is a risky option which requires time to become 
effective. The process presents different characteristics amongst firms, which makes it difficult to 
reproduce a common model for them in terms of the scope and scale of internationalisation.  
The Uppsala Model3 explains the incremental internationalisation during the 1970s of 
multinational firms and defends that firms internationalise gradually, in an incremental form, passing 
through several sequential stages. Along these stages, commitment to the international strategy 
keeps growing as does the resources involved and the scale and scope of internationalisation 
becomes greater. The most relevant research in this area is that of Johanson and Wiedersheim-
Paul (1975), which distinguishes between four different modes of entering an international market, 
according to the degree of involvement. Firstly, a firm starts with no regular export activities. During 
a second stage, it exports via independent representatives (agents) and then, it establishes an 
overseas sales subsidiary. Finally, builds overseas production/manufacturing units.  
                                                     
3 S. Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975); Johanson and Vahlne (1977) and Johanson and Vahlne (2009). Critiques of 
this model can be found in Andersen (1993). 
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To explain internationalisation across country markets, it was hypothesised that firms would 
enter new markets with a successively greater psychic distance, looking for countries with 
similarities to the nationality of the firm in terms of language, culture, political system, level of 
education and level of industrial development (Johanson and Vahlne 1977, p. 24).  The authors 
presented a more dynamic model which incorporates state aspects (resources and knowledge in a 
given time) and changing factors (current activities and decisions to commit resources to foreign 
operations) for the several stages of the internationalisation process. Their model contemplates the 
“knowledge ownership advantage” of the Dunning Paradigm, with regard to foreign markets. Better 
knowledge about markets reinforces the commitment and resources involved in a greater number of 
markets.  
The internationalisation of the International New Ventures (INV) theory (Oviatt and Mcdougall, 
1994) is related to opportunity-seeking behaviour and is centred on the entrepreneur and their 
willingness to explore a competitive advantage from the use of resources and sales in several 
countries. In the case of “international from inception” firms, founders seek growth opportunities in 
several foreign markets, exploring the resources of those countries and their network structure, 
whilst skipping stages of the Uppsala model and exploiting the “first mover” advantage. The firms 
are classified as “born global”. 
In the research of Bell; McNaughton; Young and Crick (2003), an integrative model was 
developed in order to explain the internationalisation process of small businesses, combining the 
ideas of the Uppsala model and the INV theory.  
The variety of strategies adopted by firms in the internationalisation process defines their 
pathway and can be classified according to several dimensions: time - the rapidity and pace of 
internationalisation; scale - in terms of weight of foreign sales, and; scope – which refers to the 
number of countries in which the firm operates.  
Traditional Firms internationalise slowly, in an incremental form that resembles the Uppsala 
Model. “Born-again global” firms internationalise in several foreign markets simultaneously and very 
rapidly, exploring market niches by developing a product that is well adapted to international 
demand, and through maximising industry knowledge and existing networks. Over a period of two to 
five years, foreign sales reached 25% of turn-over with operations in at least five countries. These 
firms have previously tended to focus on the domestic market, but internationalisation occurs 
suddenly as a result of a critical event/s. Focus on the domestic market for a period of up to 28 
years is acceptable, or sometimes firms started by following a path similar to that of traditional firms, 
but as a result of a critical event, they end up experiencing a more rapid process of 
internationalisation. 
2.2.    Determinants of success in the internationalisation process for family businesses 
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The success of the internationalisation process can be determined by the characteristics of 
internationalised firms.  The study of internationalised family businesses becomes very relevant, as 
it is characterised by special features, some of them can be strong points in the international field 
or, on the contrary, they can be weak points. 
In the study of the family business it is essential to consider the “3-circle” model: ownership, 
family and business (Tagiuri and Davis 1992). Ownership is a key element, and is connected to the 
presence of one or more family members in the governance structure with a key management role. 
Related to this, is the importance of succession: the continuity factor ensures that more than one 
generation is actively involved with the family business. The intergenerational transfer of a family 
business is, in effect, the transfer of ownership, and this involves a strong “personal” factor 
(European Commission 2009: 15). 
Miller and Breton-Miller (2006: 73-75) consider that a family firm’s governance structure can 
contribute to a competitive advantage. A firm managed by the founder, or by a family descendent, 
reduces agency costs, as the interests of management coincide with those of the owners. Attitudes 
of stewardship emerge more easily in a family business, as owner-managers are driven more by 
economic self-interest and the search for the collective good of their firm. On-the-job learning is 
possible, as they remain for many years in the business and the family name and reputation is in 
their hands and they are more committed to maintaining the firm for a long time. Owner-managers 
resist being goaded into risky short-term ventures and tend to prefer commitment to long-term 
investment, thus avoiding opportunistic decisions. Furthermore, concentration of ownership reduces 
the costs of monitoring.  
These aspects can permit the transfer to the international field of a business model based on 
trust (for instance, by dividing tasks and management among family members or long-serving 
employees) and a long-term horizon perspective and a network with external stakeholders (based 
on a solid reputation in terms of commitment). However, according to these authors (Miller and 
Breton-Miller 2006: 78-79), the opposite effects can be verified through the pay-out of extraordinary 
dividends, the abuse of power by taking resources out of the firm and by irresponsible leadership 
characterised by excessive risks taking. 
Gallo and Pont (1996: 46-48) highlight the internal and external factors that can enable, or 
restrict, the internationalisation process. Such external factors include: environmental factors 
connected with the competitive framework of the firm; business opportunities abroad or at home, 
and; the fit between the technological level of the firm and foreign competition and financial 
resources.  
With regards to internal factors, the authors highlighted the internal organisation of the family 
firm (for instance, a lack of experience of foreign markets, resistance to the internationalisation 
process or to increasing the internationalisation process, members of the family residing abroad 
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and the preparation of the younger generations) and also the attitudes of top management (internal 
power struggles, speed of decision making, alliances; etc.).  
As boosting factors, Gallo and Pont (1996: 57-58) emphasise long-term perspective and strong 
management. The preparation of the following generations for the international process is crucial for 
success, and maybe the very process of internationalisation will lead to the detachment of younger 
members of the family abroad, which accordingly reduces international uncertainty through the 
involvement of foreign-based family members. These authors also highlight the fact that it is multi-
generational family firms that demonstrate a higher level of internationalisation. 
Graves and Thomas (2008: 151-152) also recognized three major factors can be recognised as 
being a huge contribution to the success of the internationalisation strategy of a family firm: long-
term commitment; managerial capacities; and financial resources.  
Considering family multinationals to be international entrepreneurs that explore a competitive 
advantage, Colli, Canal-Garcia and Guillén (2013: 122-123) stress four specific sources of 
competitive advantage for family businesses: human capital; social capital; patient financial capital; 
and low agency costs. Human capital results from the accumulation of know-how and managerial 
expertise that emerges from more stable top management, thus reinforcing the coherence of the 
business model through generations. Social capital accumulated over time by members of the 
family results from their relationship with stakeholders. Patient financial capital is expressed as 
being the long-term orientation of the business.  
According to Simon and Hitt (2003: 341-346), the involvement of family resources in family 
firms can also reveal some negative results, such as: the limited availability of capital for 
investments, a lessened capacity to attract highly qualified human resources and also a lack of 
networks. 
Kontinen and Ojala (2012: 499-501) highlight the commitment and dedication of managers in 
family firms and their sense of duty, emphasising the development of attitudes of stewardship as 
means of maintaining a business for future generations. Conversely, limited managerial capabilities 
and a lack of a bridging network ties may also be in evidence. 
Patel; Pieper; Torsten and Hair Jr (2012: 235-238) focus on the internationalisation process 
and the inherent boosting and constraining characteristics of family firms during this process. The 
boost factors identified are: altruism, stewardship and trust. The constraining factors are: risk 
aversion and family conflicts. Altruism means that they all act by thinking as family members. 
Stewardship implies that they not only take care of family members, but also of clients, employees, 
suppliers and the community as a whole. The stewardship attitude leads family members to 
considerer the longevity of the firm and thus to take decisions that facilitate the success of the 
business across generations. These two attitudes can engender trust, thus increasing cohesion. 
Cohesion is important for collective action, as it allows for being better prepared for risk and 
uncertainty, which is a natural component of the internationalisation process. 
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Owner-manager coincidence can be a key asset for family firms, as ownership gives managers 
the power to make decisions about the level and scope of the internationalisation process. Family 
firms can also provide essential resources for the business, both tangible (financial resources and a 
low payroll as firms use family members as employees) and intangible (social networks, altruism 
and stewardship, attitudes which contribute to cohesion and a long-term approach). Within this 
scope, those characteristics that can hamper the process of internationalisation include: resource 
restrictions (human and financial), risk aversion (delay or a slowdown in international presence) and 
family conflicts (about controlling the destiny of the family firm, about reinvesting earnings in 
international expansion, etc.).  
In terms of management, the prevalence of internal succession (Colli, Canal-Garcia and Guillén 
2013: 33-34; 45) and a context of union between the interests of both family and the firm, may 
provide the foundation for long-term strategies. However, if the leader’s experience within the firm is 
not complimented by the presence of networks and contacts at several levels - e.g. at the 
commercial and financial levels, then the intangible resources of a family firm may be lower.  
Family firms can be seen as being capable of building a network of trust, but this network can 
also be extended to the local community where the business is located (Colli, Canal-Garcia and 
Guillén 2013: 32-33). Although the family may supply labour, financial resources and information, 
the boundaries of the family firm go far beyond family ties and also embrace the values and culture 
of a larger group. Family firms are embedded within social networks of trust, sharing the values and 
attitudes of a larger group that influences not only family behaviour, but also the business. In the 
next section a connection is made between the family firm and its location. 
 
 
2.3 Clusters, industrial districts and the location of family firms 
 
The choice of location by family firms can be a relevant determinant of their economic 
performance and, in a long run perspective, of their ultimate failure or success. Clusters and 
industrial districts are spatial concepts that need to be taken into consideration in order to 
understand these choices.  
Alfred Marshall was the first author to use the term industrial district, in his book entitled 
Principles of Economics (1890; 1920), defining it as a “concentration of specialised industries in 
particular localities”, which allows the benefits of external economies due to spill-overs as, in his 
own words - “in districts in which manufactures have long been domiciled, a habit of responsibility, 
of carefulness and promptitude in handling expensive machinery and materials becomes the 
common property of all.  The mysteries of industry become no mysteries, but are, as it were, in the 
air, and children learn many of them unconsciously”. This definition is particularly well-suited to 
family businesses that contribute with internal family ties to external relations and common trust, 
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playing a central role in socialising values and work practices among small local firms over many 
generations. 
The notion of marshallian industrial districts was many decades later improved by Giacomo 
Becattini (Becattini, 1990) and applied to the reality of the “Third Italy”, which is a set of 
northeastern and central regions in this country that evolved from local ethnic communal cultures 
based on trust and cooperation among firms and between bosses and employees, where families 
once played more a central role.  
Given the existence in Italy of important industrial conglomerates that do not accomplish all the 
criteria of an Industrial district, Giacchino Garofoli coined the term Local Productive Systems 
(Climent, 1997 p. 99), which allows for a more encompassing definition of these realities. 
Previously, the notion of Industrial district had also been used and popularised by Michael 
Porter (1990), with a similar content, but under a different guise, which was the concept of the 
“cluster”, which was defined by this author as - “a geographical concentration of interconnected 
companies, specialised suppliers, service providers, firms in related industries, and associated 
institutions (e.g., universities, standard agencies, trade associations) in a particular field that 
compete and also cooperate” (Porter, 1998). Apparently this concept is not so well fitted to (small) 
family firms, but it may become very important for these kinds of businesses to be immersed in a 
cluster located in a geographical area, in order to benefit from its external economies. 
Although criticised by some authors as being somewhat vague, or fuzzy notions (Martin and 
Sunley, 2003), clusters and industrial districts can all be operational concepts that are useful for 
understanding the relative performance of family firms, both internally and externally.  
In the particular case of the two cork family firms studied in this paper, economic performance 
was certainly conditioned, among other factors, by the different kind of regional clusters chosen: 
Setubal, a southern district of Portugal was chosen by Mundet, and Santa Maria da Feira, a 
northern district, was the choice of Corticeira Amorim.  
The implications of these different choices of location and of the influence of the characteristics 
of the two families - Mundet and Amorim, in the evolution of the businesses will be addressed in the 
next section. 
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3. Determinants of success and failure in the internationalisation process: two case 
studies – Mundet & Cª and Corticeira Amorim  
 
3.1. Main features of these firms and their internationalisation model3.2. The 1755 
earthquake 
 
The cork business has always had an international character. The two leading countries in this 
business, Spain and Portugal, export most of their production of cork worldwide (both manufactured 
and as raw material). A longitudinal study, of almost one century, that considers two of the most 
relevant Iberian family cork firms, is of interest for the research field of internationalisation and 
family firm features.  
In fact, Mundet & Cª, Lda and Corticeira Amorim emerge as two paradigmatic cases of 
entrepreneurship during the 20th Century, as they both followed a strategy from the beginning that 
explored the natural competitive advantage of the Iberian Peninsula. The two firms are 
contemporaneous, and faced the same alterations in the institutional and technological framework 
of the cork business. 
To test the hypothesis mentioned in the introduction and to answer the research questions, we 
opted for a qualitative research method by analysing the historical trajectory of the two firms, 
highlighting the way in which the family character of the firms, and also their location, were critical to 
the creation of a competitive advantage that reinforced the natural advantage of the Iberian 
Peninsula. 
A systematic analysis and comparison of a collection of chronological data on the life of the two 
firms was made, from their establishment, up until the 1980s, taking into consideration the most 
important events that allow the identification of their international pathways and the familiar context 
which influenced the choice of those paths (generations, successions, conflicts, etc.). 
 The internationalisation strategies of the two firms suggest that both, the Uppsala and the 
Innovation models are useful for explaining the internationalisation process. 
 
 
3.1.1 Mundet&Cª, Lda. (1865-1988)4 
 
Mundet resembles a “born-again global firm”. In 1865, Lorenzo Mundet, the founder, already 
had two factories, one in San Antonio de Calonge and the other in Palamós (Catalonia).  
In 1895, one of his sons, José Mundet, opened a new factory in Brooklyn (New York). 
                                                     
4 The facts about Mundet were collected in Filipe and Afonso (2010). 
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In 1902, his other son, Arturo Mundet, opened a factory in Mexico and José Mundet opened a 
business in Canada that same year. The causes for that decision came from business difficulties in 
the natural cork business, facing during that time the severe completion of agglomerated cork.  
In 1905, a new factory was opened in Seixal (Portugal) and with this, thirty years after the 
foundation of the factory in Catalonia and well into the second generation, Mundet was already a 
multinational with four overseas production plants (United States, Canada, Mexico, Portugal).   
In 1906 Mundet underwent a complete relocation and the company headquarters were moved 
from Catalonia to Portugal, and at the same time it changed its specialisation from natural cork 
stoppers to agglomerated cork.  
During the 1930s, Mundet & C.ª already had 12 factories – located in Portugal, Spain, Algeria 
and England (Mundet Cork & Plastics) -, and the Mundet Cork Corporation had 2 units, one in the 
United States and the other in Canada (Mundet Cork & Insulation). 
The manager of the Portuguese and Algerian units was Luis Gubert i Cappelá, the son-in-law 
of the founder. The units in the United States and Canada were managed by José Mundet (second 
generation) and later by Joseph Mundet Jr (third generation), who, at the end of the 1940s, also 
assumed total control of Mundet & Cª. In 1946 a new plant was opened in Jimena de la Frontera 
(near Cadiz, in Andalucía, Spain), and by 1958 the firm had almost 4,000 employees.  
 
 
Table 1 - Characteristics of the internationalisation behaviour of Mundet 
 
           Issue                            Mundet 
Trigger/Motivation Initially reactive (due to difficulties in the Catalonian  
cork business) and then proactive.  
Internationalisation patterns First exporting, and then creating production units in  
several countries. 
Pace of Internationalisation At the beginning, the firm only exported and then after  
more than 20 years of existence, it followed an  
exponential growth of internationalisation, becoming 
multinational. 
Method of entry into foreign markets Established overseas processing plants  whilst  
maintaining total control (concentration of ownership  
and management). 
International strategies Adaptation to the United States market, producing cork  
disks (the development of a new product for  
the international market).  
Method of financing internationalisation  Internally-generated funds and new shareholders  
(non-family members). 
Source: Author’s elaboration, based on Graves and Thomas (2008:153) and Falize and Coeurderoy (2012: 4-6) 
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3.1.2. Corticeira Amorim5 1922-… 
 
All the aspects of the internationalisation pathway of Corticeira Amorim are similar to those of 
traditional firms.  
The origins of Corticeira Amorim go back to 1908, when the Amorim family established a small 
workshop producing cork stoppers at Santa Maria de Lamas (in the county of Santa Maria da Feira, 
in the north of Portugal). The older sons of António Alves Amorim (the founder), and six employees 
comprised the total man-power of the workshop, which produced cork stoppers for the Port wine 
trade, the English market being the most important client. 
By 1917 the Amorim family already had a factory in Cortinhas (also in Santa Maria da Feira), 
but Amorim & Irmãos was only founded in 1922, and it became a family business that would project 
the export of Portuguese stoppers to the whole world. In the 1930s, Amorim & Irmãos was already 
the largest manufactured cork producer in the north of the Country, with 150 employees. During this 
decade, the firm adopted a strategy of backward vertical integration, by acquiring a small store in 
Abrantes (Portugal), near one of the biggest areas of cork oak forest, which was also near the 
railway line. In 1939 this store became a factory, producing planks for the main factory. In the 
1940s, Amorim & Irmãos already employed 321 staff and had a production capacity of 70,000 cork 
stoppers a day. Using a definition by Chandler (1990), the firm could be classified as a “big 
business”. 
The firm followed a path of incremental and gradual international expansion, starting with the 
use of agents/distributors or wholesalers. Although it was founded in 1922, it was only in the third 
generation that it adopted a more aggressive form of internationalisation, by opening plants abroad. 
Until then, the most important diversification of the international market for natural cork stoppers 
had been the emigration of the two sons of the founder to Brazil. The firm also had a sales agent in 
France, located close to the distribution channels of champagne. 
Together with Corticeira Amorim, which was also located in Santa Maria da Feira, from the 
1960s onwards, the business went through a process of partial relocation and vertical integration, 
but maintained the production of natural stoppers as its main area of specialisation. Corticeira 
Amorim had 40 employees and also employed an expert from Mundet. This partial relocation 
resulted in the firm opening several new units, but nonetheless it retained its pre-existing unit, i.e. it 
became a multi-plant company that differentiated its production in spatial terms. The vertical 
                                                     
5 The first company of the Amorim Group, as it is known nowadays, was the firm Amorim & Irmãos, which was founded 
in 1922. Corticeira Amorim was founded in 1963. In 1969, the partners of this company purchased 40% shares form their 
cousins in Amorim & Irmãos and also acquired an interest in the shares of the remaining shareholders (uncles and aunts 
from the second generation), and the firm became Corticeira Amorim, CA.. For further details about the firm and family 
Amorim history see also Santos (1997), and Branco and Parejo (2011). 
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strategy was followed-up by a more intensive process of internationalisation, with some relocation 
of production, both inside the domestic market and also abroad. This type of relocation does not 
necessarily affect the whole production process, but instead affects just one branch, and it can arise 
from different types of agreements between the firms involved, ranging from joint ventures to 
subcontracting, or even the acquisition of a small part of the share capital.  
 
 
Table 2 - Characteristics of the internationalisation behaviour of Corticeira Amorim  
 
    Issue Corticeira Amorim  
Trigger/Motivation Reactive and related to the succession by the third 
generation with managers, strongly committed to 
internationalisation.  
Internationalisation patterns Grow incrementally by progressively entering 
foreign markets with greater psychic distance. 
Target low-tech/less sophisticated markets. Limited 
evidence of networks at the beginning. 
Pace of Internationalisation Gradual internationalisation (focus on a small 
number of key markets, as only one family-member 
had contact with the clients), becoming more 
intense since the 1960s, almost fifty years after the 
foundation of the firm. 
Method of entry into foreign markets Conventional. The use of agents/distributors or 
wholesalers for direct sale to customers. Foreign 
Direct Investment was only adopted later. 
International strategies Initially only stoppers were produced, and then 
agglomerated products. 
Method of financing internationalisation  With internally generated funds until the 1980s,  
and then with stock market and bank finance.  
Source: Author’s elaboration, based on Graves and Thomas (2008:153) and Falize and Coeurderoy (2012: 4-6). 
 
 
3.2 The family firm determinants of success and failure 
 
When Mundet started on its course for internationalisation, the ownership base was sole-
ownership by its founder, Lorenzo Mundet. With the opening of three production units, in the United 
States, Mexico and Canada, the ownership was divided - but not in equal parts – among the two 
brothers (each with 1/3 of the shares each) and the remaining shares were divided in equal shares 
between the father and the son-in-law. In 1920s, the ownership was also divided between outside 
shareholders, when Mundet embarked on a spectacular expansion plan, which ended up putting 
the firm under financial and management stress.  
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José Mundet, the son of the founder, became the major shareholder and owner-manager in the 
American branch of the business, and when he died, Joseph Mundet Jr assumed control. In 
Portugal, the manager was the son-in-law of Lorenzo Mundet, Luis Guibert i Cappelá. These two 
managers (Joseph and Luis) certainly had different visions about the family business, and they 
disputed the ownership of the family business in court, jeopardizing the harmony of the family, as 
the division of shares was not equal, and Joseph Mundet held the majority. Together with the 
presence of non-family shareholders, the possibility of disagreement was increased. Luis did not 
agree with Joseph having the majority of the shares.  
One of the questions that certainly led to disagreement, was problems in the American market, 
where substitutes for natural cork emerged faster, which made it hard to define the future steps of 
the family business. The lack of trust and the absence of strong family bonds caused greater 
management costs. One of the causes of failure was indisputably the absence of “familiarity”, or 
features of a family firm that would allow for the survival of the firm in adverse economic times.  
In the case of Corticeira Amorim, up until 1988 – when it was quoted on the stock market – all 
the shareholders were family members with equal shareholdings in the firm. Firstly, in 1908, there 
was one owner, the founder, and then in 1922 his sons (second generation) became partners (all 
nine of the brothers, although in 1939, the number of shareholders was reduced to just 5 brothers6). 
The second and third generations were groomed from an early age to work in the family cork 
business. 
The firm next entered into a phase of being a “cousins consortium”, with the creation of 
Corticeira Amorim in 1963, whereby four brothers (third generation) and one uncle (second 
generation) divided the ownership of the firm, each holding 20% of the shares. Even when the firm 
went public, the majority of shares were retained by the family. 
This comparison suggests that ownership structure is important for success. An unequal 
ownership seems to lead to greater disagreement on the way forward with regards to 
internationalisation, whereas an equal distribution of shares between family members may 
contribute to success, as well as the concentration of ownership amongst family members.  
In the case of the Amorim Group, clarification regarding the different positions of the family 
members regarding the path to internationalisation led to the creation of a new and highly 
internationalised unit of production - Corticeira Amorim - which was just owned by those family 
members who were in agreement about the intensity and direction of internationalisation that was 
defended by Américo Amorim (the grandson of the founder, third generation). Any radical decision 
about the international strategy of the firm was impossible if family members were in disagreement 
about that strategy, as harmony reigned and was the dominant behaviour. The shares of Amorim & 
                                                     
6 Three brothers went to Brazil and one died.  
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Irmãos that belonged to the brothers and cousins who were in disagreement with Américo Amorim, 
were sold to Corticeira Amorim, which enabled the development of solid cohesion and leadership 
for many years, which, up to now, is based on the charisma of Américo Amorim. 
The business was divided into two production units, both highly connected, yet producing 
different products (Amorim &Irmãos - natural stoppers, which was the original business of the 
family, and Corticeira Amorim - agglomerated cork).  
Regarding stewardship characteristics, substantial differences occur between the two family 
firms. In the case of Mundet, considerable investments were made in Portugal to meet the needs of 
the American market, which led the company to adopt a very risky strategy in terms of dependence 
on a single market. However, the expansion of this market did not live up to expectations as the 
demand for agglomerated cork slowed down. This option reveals a weaker attitude to stewardship, 
which resulted from the dual management of the firm, with one manager in the United States and 
the other in Portugal. When Joseph Mundet started to own most of the business in Portugal, and yet 
was absent from the production units located there, the failure of the firm’s strategy was inevitable. 
As the owner–manager, he started to take very risky options for the firm, without perceiving the drop 
in demand, which ended up placing the firm in financial stress.  
The lack of strong family bonds and the absence of trust resulted in larger management costs, 
and growing disagreement between the grandson of the founder and the son-in-law of the founder. 
Although there were several other managers who were shareholders of the Portuguese branch, 
they had unequal voting power to that of Jospeh Mundet Jr, who revealed a selfish style of 
management and direction of the firm’s future. A growing number of shareholders - all non-family 
members and in-laws - became a source of conflict and a potential source of a bias in favour of 
family candidates for the succession of the founder - namely his son, and afterwards his grandson, 
which alienated other talented managers. 
On the contrary, good stewardship was very evident in the Amorim Group. From the beginning, 
the second generation was involved with the various operations of the firm, and each family 
member had a mission within the firm. When the firm's interests differed from personal interests, 
family members chose to leave the company. Prudent international expansion was the dominant 
strategy, which revealed characteristics of a path similar to that shown in Uppsala model - an entry 
mode with high control that meant that any risky decision was impossible, as everyone had the 
same number of shares. The sense of duty towards the firm was very high, as was cohesion and 
trust.  
Similar in both cases was the social network built by the families. However, in the case of 
Mundet, these in-family relationships led to the creation of new businesses (in the form of foreign 
direct investment) in the U.S. (controlled by Jose Mundet) and México (controlled by Arturo 
Mundet). The higher costs involved made it more difficult to respond to adverse levels of demand. 
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In the case of Amorim, the internationalisation process was started by using sales agents and 
the family maintained very close relationships with them. Members of the Amorim family frequently 
visited the firm’s customers, thus strengthening the relationship of trust between buyer-seller 
through face-to-face relationships. The lower fixed costs involved in this form of international 
trajectory made possible a rapid response to falls in demand. 
 
 
3.3. The effects of location choices of Mundet and Corticeira Amorim  
 
The location choices of firms are important determinants of its economic performance and 
resilience, or lack of it, as the case studies of Mundet and Amorim both clearly show. 
In the case of Mundet, the choice of starting the business in Portugal in the southern district of 
Setubal, near the river Tagus and the capital, Lisbon, was a reasonable one as for a start, the cost 
of land for building the first factory was low, as it belonged to a soap firm that had closed. It was a 
good location for two other reasons: its relative proximity to the raw material suppliers (the best cork 
in Portugal, and by far the largest quantity, comes from the Alentejo and the Ribatejo, two southern 
regions of the country), and also its close proximity to the port of Lisbon, the main outlet for 
exporting cork products, which were essentially stoppers (Sala and Nadal, 2010).   
The firm Amorim & Irmãos chose another, very different location to develop its cork activity - 
Santa Maria da Feira, in the north of Portugal. The main reason was essentially that of a family 
nature: the wife of the firm’s founder, António Alves Amorim, was born there (in Santa Maria de 
Lamas, which has been an iconic location for the firm ever since) and maintained strong family ties 
with the region. This region is not far away from Oporto, a city which has a well-established and 
strong tradition with the wine business, and the important port of Leixões. Yet other regions are 
better located than Santa Maria da Feira from this point of view, such as Vila Nova de Gaia, close 
by, which proves that the family element was crucial in this case (Santos, 1997).  
But this choice of Amorim had an apparent, and potentially strong, disadvantage relative to 
Mundet’s choice, being the much greater distance of Santa Maria da Feira from the major cork-
producing regions of Portugal, particularly at a period of time and in a country characterised by high 
transport costs.  
One of the major curious and interesting aspects of these case studies is that what appeared to 
be a strong disadvantage in the early phase of the business – up until the 1930s, and then actually 
turned out to be a determinant advantage for Amorim over Mundet, for several reasons, which up to 
now have not been studied much, and deserve a paper on their own, which we synthesise below. 
The first comparative advantage of Santa Maria da Feira versus Setúbal, relates to labour 
costs, as the wage policy of the Estado Novo benefitted northern industries, as wages were fixed by 
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law and were lower in this region (see, e.g., Branco and Parejo, 2008, 2011; Lopes and Branco; 
2013). 
Another important advantage of Santa Maria da Feira was the low incidence of political, social 
and labour conflict, which was an important determinant during the post-Revolution period after 
1974, which marked the re-instauration of democracy in Portugal, as this region was mainly rural 
with small firms, whereas Setubal was a region populated by large firms, with a strong union 
movement and a tradition of resistance to the dictatorship that was characterised by a tendency to 
stand up and fight for labour rights. 
 But perhaps the most important and lasting advantage of Santa Maria da Feira, which is highly 
applicable to the Corticeira Amorim versus Mundet comparison, relates to the different kind of 
cluster, or Industrial District, between the two locations. In Santa Maria da Feira the tradition of the 
cork industry is much stronger (using the original terms of Marshall, “it is in the air…”), as 
demonstrated by a family nature of keeping and handing down very small firms, some of which 
even operate out of a garage, which gave precious support and flexibility to the anchor firm of 
Amorim, but none of this was felt by Mundet in Setúbal (Mira, 1994; Ruivo, 1995; 1996). 
The Amorim Group gained tangible and intangible benefits from just being located in an 
established industrial district: lower wages, social networks, the reinforcement of trust and cohesion 
and reputation, which are all essential characteristics that were later transposed to the international 
area of the firm. The concentration of highly specialised small firms which bonded with each other, 
permitted a high degree of cooperation in both the vertical and the horizontal sense (Bonacoorsi 
1992: 628-629). There was a better response to fluctuations of demand without the need for 
additional investment in production capacity, as the firm could subcontract the production of 
stoppers out to small workshops, which were often owned by the firm’s employees, who thus 
earned some additional income. 
A more careful, detailed, historical and empirical analysis is required to measure to what 
degree these location aspects were determinant for the economic performance of both the firms 
and eventually the collapse of Mundet and the success of Amorim, deserves. However the fact that 
they played an important role in this context is beyond any reasonable doubt. 
 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
The economic performance of firms and, ultimately in the long run, their failure or success, 
depends on many economic, financial, technological, social and even political factors, which are 
difficult to incorporate in just one sole paper, as we have attempted to do in this study of Mundet 
and Corticeira Amorim. This research must then be understood to be a contribution towards the 
study of this question, which consisting of a comparative perspective of the evolution of these two 
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firms, which emphasises three essential factors: their internationalisation strategies, their family 
business behaviour and their choices of location. 
The theoretical framework is accordingly based on the internationalisation models, the 
business family theory and the economics of clusters and industrial districts. The internationalisation 
models used were the Upsalla model, the Born Global Firm and the Newborn Global Firm. The 
family business aspect that were considered were: ownership, succession, management, 
stewardship and decisions about financing. The clusters and industrial districts analysis is based on 
a well-known regional science study, which is reminiscent of Alfred Marshall’s pioneering approach 
and is subsequently elaborated and expanded by Giacomo Becattini and Michael Porter. 
Although the histories of the two important Iberian cork industry firms are well studied in many 
books and articles, up to now they have only been studied independently and thus, to the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first attempt to make an all-encompassing comparative analysis of the 
two firms, using well documented historical and empirical sources, supported by a strong theoretical 
framework. 
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the main determinants of the economic 
performance of these two firms, which ultimately led to the closure of Mundet in the 1980s, after 
having being one of the most important firms in the cork business during almost all the previous 
century, and to the enormous success of Corticeira Amorim, which became, and still is, the 
undisputed world leader in the cork business.    
After a brief description of the main characteristics of the cork industry, which is essentially a 
business restricted to Iberia, as Portugal and Spain possess the bulk of the raw material, the main 
section of this paper starts by identifying the internationalisation models of the two firms. Mundet is 
best described by the Born Global model, with a strong initial expansion in the USA and other 
countries, whereas Amorim is more a kind of Traditional model, where the first exports were made 
through foreign agents, before embarking on a strong expansion of production and trade through 
affiliates. This prudent strategy of the Portuguese company may prove to be an advantage in the 
fight for the worldwide dominance of the cork business. 
The family facets of these two companies were also very important in determining their relative 
economic performance and resilience to economic and other shocks, and once more, Amorim 
demonstrated more advantages. The Amorim family has always been more united, cohesive and 
more cautious, and yet at the same time it has proved to be more ground-breaking in terms of 
business. It has wisely sought to keep ownership and control of the firm from the first to the fourth 
generation of the family and is better at managing the problems of succession and shareholding. 
The role of outsiders (i.e. non-family members) in management and financing decisions were much 
less important than in the case of Mundet. The three mechanisms of family ownership that created 
a competitive advantage were absent in the case of Mundet, which led to the emergence of 
tensions and conflicts. 
Finally, Corticeira Amorim gained a competitive advantage over Mundet with regards to the 
choice of location. Although the initial site for Mundet’s operations in Portugal in 1905, appeared to 
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be a very good choice, in that the southern district of Setubal was close to both raw material 
producers (located mainly in the Alentejo and the Ribatejo) and the large export facility of the port of 
Lisbon, it ultimately became a source of trouble for the business. The main reasons were the 
politico-economic decision of the Estado Novo to establish higher wages in the southern regions of 
the country in order to protect the small firms of the north, and also the turbulence of the period after 
the Revolution of 1974, which was much greater in the south of the country, than in the north.  
The location of Corticeira Amorim at Santa Maria da Feira, which is a northern region of 
Portugal, was based mainly on a family motive which has been explained previously, which 
ultimately proved to be a crucial advantage, not only from the labour point of view as mentioned 
above, but also because this firm has been successful in creating a well-functioning Marshallian 
type industrial district, which has the cork industry tradition “in the air”, which is passed from 
generation to generation, through a myriad of small and very small firms, which gave flexibility and a 
subcontracted production base which led to the ingenious dominance of the Amorim family 
business. 
In conclusion, the family character of a firm is not always an advantage. If the family that owns 
the firm is united, then the firm benefits from the resulting trust and cohesion. If the case is the 
opposite, then a family firm becomes a source of conflict and tension, as demonstrated by the case 
of Mundet. Maybe such harmony is also derived from the “district effect”, as the family in this case, 
has a commitment to the region and to its people. This was the case for the Amorim family. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
A1. Chronology of Mundet & C.ª, Lda. 1865-1988 
1865 - Lorenzo Mundet i Corominas (first generation, founder) came from a long line of cork 
industrialists. His wife, Teresa Carbó i Saguer, was the daughter of a small-scale cork industrialist 
from Catalonia, for whom Lorenzo began to work in 1865, in the town of San Antonio de Calonge, 
in the province of Girona (Catalonia, Spain). 
1895 – José Mundet, the son of Lorenzo (second generation), opened a small cork factory in 
Brooklin (New York) – Mundet & Sons, a subsidiary of L. Mundet & Hijos in Catalonia.  
1898 – A new factory was opened in Palamós (Catalonia), a few kilometres from San Antonio de 
Calonge.  
1902 - Arturo Mundet, son of Lorenzo and brother of José, opened a new cork factory for the 
group in Mexico - Casa Mundet Mexico. José Mundet opened a new unit in Canada - Mundet Cork 
& Insulation, and was also the Chairman. 
1905 - Mundet open a new factory in Seixal (Setúbal, Portugal), close to the Lisbon harbour, on 
the south bank of the Tagus River. L. Mundet & Sons had four partners: José Mundet i Carbó, 
Arturo Mundet i Carbó (each with 1/3 of the shares), Lorenzo Mundet and Luis Gubert i Capellà 
(married to Carolina Mundet i Carbó, daughter of Lorenzo and sister of José and Arturo) held the 
remaining shares, which were divided in equal parts. The first managing director of the Portuguese 
unit was Luíz Gubert i Cappelà. This unit produced cork stoppers, cork discs and other cork 
artefacts as well as leftovers. The unit in Seixal employed 200 workers in 1905; 430 workers in 
1913 and a total of 600 workers in 1916. It closed its doors in 1988. 
1906 - L. Mundet & Hijos was liquidated and became L. Mundet & Sons, a family firm with four 
partners which was a multinational company has it possessed four sales and productive units (in 
the United States, Canada, Mexico and Portugal).  
1907 – Opening of a new factory of cork planks at Vendas Novas (Portugal) 
1908 – The company changed its name to L. Mundet & Sons Incorporated, and also moved its 
headquarters from Catalonia to Portugal, opting for a full delocalisation strategy from Spain to 
Seixal, in Portugal. Firstly José Mundet, and then his son, Joseph Mundet Jr, were the majority 
shareholders. 
1914 - Opening of a new cork factory for the preparation of raw materials in Mora (Évora, 
Portugal), which was in operation until 1963.  
1915 – Creation of the paper cork section at the Seixal unit. 
1917 – Opening of a new unit in Amora (Seixal, Portugal) for the production of discs and stoppers. 
This factory was closed in 1967.  
1917 - Opening of a new unit in Vendas Novas (Portugal), to produce prepared cork. Closed its 
doors in 1952. 
1920 – A new factory was opened in New Jersey, to produce agglomerated cork. 
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1921 and 1924 – Opening of two new factories in Montijo (Portugal) to produce granulated cork 
and agglomerated cork (black; pure and composite agglomerated cork). They both closed their 
doors in 1988. 
1922 – The units in Portugal were all integrated into a new firm – Mundet & Companhia, Lda, with 
three partners: José Mundet, Luis Gubert i Cappelá and Joaquim de Sousa (a non-family partner), 
all of them working as managers of the firm. This new firm maintained close relations with Mundet 
& Sons in the United States, selling the Portuguese cork production (stoppers, raw material and 
agglomerated cork) to the American market through Mundet & Sons. The American and Canadian 
branch and the English branch had the same managing director - José Mundet. 
1924 - Opening of a new factory for cork preparation in Algeria. The manager of Mundet Africa SA 
was Luis Gubert. 
1926 - Opening of a sales warehouse in Croydon (England) - Mundet Cork Products, Ltd 
(England), which was also an affiliate of Mundet & C.ª. 
1927 - The share capital of Mundet & C.ª was reinforced. 
1927 – Opening of a new factory at Ponte de Sor (Portalegre, Portugal), and another in Algeria. 
1928 - Another factory was opened in San Vicente de Alcántara (Extremadura), for processing 
cork from this Spanish region - Corchos Mundet España, S.A. (San Vicente de Alcantara) was 
affiliated to Mundet & C.ª, which was managed by Joaquim de Sousa.  
1930 - L. Mundet & Sons, Inc. became Mundet Cork Corporation with two units, one in New York 
and the other in New Jersey. This firm had exclusivity for the sale of the cork that came from 
Mundet & C.ª and also had exclusivity in other markets. In 1962 it was sold to Crown Cork & Seal. 
1936 – The management team of Mundet & C.ª consisted of: José Mundet (second generation) , 
Luis Gubert (married with the daughter of the founder); Joaquim de Sousa; José María Genis 
Arolas; Antonio Iglesias Cruz and Luis Gubert i Mundet (ground son, third generation). 
1938 – Was a turning point in terms of the management of Mundet & C.ª, as José Mundet gave his 
son the majority of shares and others to José Genis and Antonio Iglesias. By doing so, he allowed 
Joseph Mundet of the third generation to become the majority partner and he was nominated 
managing director of Mundet & C.ª until his death in 1962.  
1939 – The mandate of Joseph Mundet was suspended and the management of the company was 
carried out by Luis Gubert, Joaquim de Sousa and Luis Gubert i Mundet.  
1940 - José Mundet dies and Joseph Mundet, his son, assumed the role of Chairman of the 
Mundet Cork Corporation. Since that date only conflict took place, culminating in a court case in 
which the shares and managerial powers were transferred to Joseph Mundet, José María Genis, 
Antonio Iglesias and Henry Cant.  
 1946 - A new unit was opened in Jimena de la Frontera (Andalusia/Spain).   
1947 – Luis Gubert and Joaquim de Sousa sued Joseph Mundet Jr. and the remaining partners. 
They lost and the partnership was dissolved.  
1949 - Joaquim de Sousa, Luis Gubert, Luis Gubert i Mundet and Teresa Gubert Gomes sell their 
shares. 
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1951 – António Iglesias sell his shares to Joseph Mundet Jr. and José María Genis. 
1953 – Joseph Mundet Jr, José María Genis and José Azeredo Perdigão were the managers of 
Mundet & C.ª. 
1958 – The company had several new partners: José Azeredo Perdigão, José Genis Gorgot, 
Antonio Costa Guerra and Miguel Antonio Horta e Costa. 
1962 – Joseph Mundet Jr died and his wife became the major shareholder. 
(…) 
1986 – Paula Mundet died. 
1988- The Seixal and Montijo units were closed down. 
1992 – Bankruptcy was declared for Mundet & C.ª.   
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A.2 Chronology of The Amorim Group 1908 - … 
 
1908 – The Amorim family moved to Lamas (Feira /Portugal) and opened a factory.  The founder 
of this factory, António Alves Amorim, his wife, Ana Pinto Alves, and their eleven sons were the 
main employees of the factory, together with six other employees.  They only produced stoppers. 
1922 – The family built a new factory at Lamas (Feira/Portugal) and founded the firm of Amorim & 
Irmãos, with the nine sons of António Alves Amorim as partners (second generation). Three of the 
brothers went to Brazil and two of then also founded firms connected to the cork business 
(Amorim & Pinto and Amorim & Coelho). 
1935 – Opening of a new unit in Abrantes (Portugal) to produce their own cork planks.  
1939 – The firm was reduced to 5 shareholders (five brothers), who were the brothers who 
remained in Portugal. At this time the firm had 150 employees. 
1940s – The firm Amorim & Irmãos had 321 employees and produced daily almost 700,000 
stoppers and almost 200 firms were dependent on it in terms of raw material and credit. The third 
generation entered the business and the various tasks within the company were divided among 
members of the family. 
1960 – The Sociedade de Isolamento de Cortiça (agglomerated cork) was founded in Brazil. 
1963 – Corticeira Amorim was founded in Mozelos (Feira/Portugal). There were five shareholders: 
4 brothers (third generation) and one uncle (second generation). They were also shareholders of 
Amorim & Irmãos, which had 600 employees. This new firm produced agglomerated cork with the 
cork leftovers from Amorim & Irmãos. 
1968 – The firm Inacor was founded, which belonged to the cousins (third generation), which also 
produced agglomerated cork. 
1966 – Corticeira Amorim Algarve was founded, also producing agglomerated cork. 
1967 – Gerard Schiesser Gmbh in Vienna was founded as a sales agent for the Eastern market.  
1969 –The sons of Américo Alves Amorim (third generation) bought the firms of Amorim & Irmãos 
and Itexcork in Vendas Novas (Portugal) from their cousins, as well as Inacor. The firm became 
Corticeira Amorim CA. 
1970s – The importance of the American market was reduced and the European market became 
more important. Santa Maria da Feira (Portugal) became the centre of cork stopper production, 
but there was some diversification in terms of cork products.  
1972 – The group bought Comatral (production of cork planks) in Morocco (Africa). 
1976 – The group bought Samec (planks production) in Seville (Spain)  
1978 – Opening of a new unit at Santa Maria da Feira (Aveiro,Portugal) - Ipocork. 
1982 – Champcork was founded in Lamas (Aveiro,Portugal), producing stoppers for sparkling 
wine. 
1983 – Creation of Labcork.  
1984 – Creation of the Hungarokork-Amorim partnership between Corticeira Amorim and two 
Hungarian publically quoted firms. 
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1984 – José Amorim, one of the shareholders, did not agree with his brothers about the firm’s 
strategy and left the firm, selling his share to his brother. 
1988 – The group opened the share capital to other shareholders, but the family kept the majority. 
The firm is now called Corticeira Amorim SGPS. 
1990s – The fourth generation enters the business with degrees in management. 
(…) 
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